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Abstract
Thisquantitative studyanalyses the sentencingpracticeof the InternationalCriminalTribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The sentencing process is only loosely regulated by the
ICTY Statute, and consequently it is not clear how judges exercise their broad discretionary
sentencing powers in practice. By analysing the existing case law, legal factors inﬂuencing the
sentencing decisions are examined. The extent to which the selected factors predict sentence
length is tested in amultiple regression analysis. The analysis suggests that the sentence can be
to a large extent predicted by legal criteria. The number of offences and the rank of the offender
are the strongest predictors of sentence length in the model.
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The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) can be seen
as one of the pioneering institutions in the ﬁeld of international criminal justice.
Its jurisprudence has set a number of important legal precedents and contributed
signiﬁcantly to the development of many areas of not only substantive but also
procedural international criminal law. Whether the same can be said of the ICTY’s
sentencing policy has been a matter of some controversy. Not only have individual
sentencingdecisionsof theTribunalbeencriticizedbut alsooverall ICTYsentencing
practicehas beendesignated as inappropriate, ﬂawed, and inconsistent.1 This article
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Criminology, Faculty of Law, VUUniversity Amsterdam.
1 SeeM. Bagaric and J. Morss, ‘International Sentencing Law: In Search of a Justiﬁcation and Coherent Frame-
work’, (2006) 6 International Criminal LawReview 191, at 255; G. Endo, ‘NullumCrimenNulla Poena Sine Lege
Principle and the ICTY and ICTR’, (2002) 15 Revue que´be´coise de droit international 205, at 205; M. B. Harmon
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addresses some of these concerns by statistically analysing the sentences handed
down by the Tribunal to date.
From the inception of the ICTY it has been consistently emphasized that despite
the condemnable andhorrendous character of the atrocities committed in the territ-
oryof theformerYugoslavia,proceedingsconductedbeforetheTribunalshouldinall
regards respect the principles of fair trial. Itwas presumed that only fair proceedings
and sentencing could lead to the attaining of the Tribunal’s fourfold objectives: to
hold accountable those responsible for the crimes and, by doing this, to bring justice
to victims, to deter further crimes, and to bring peace to the Yugoslavian region.2 It
is therefore of the utmost importance for the achievement of the Tribunal’smission
to hold fair trials and to deliver fair sentences. In order to be fair, sentences need
to be clear, predictable, and proportionate, or, in other words, consistent. The need
for consistent sentencing has been recognized by the ICTY itself. In the Cˇelebic´i case
the ICTYAppeals Chamber noted, ‘One of the fundamental elements in any rational
and fair system of criminal justice is consistency of punishment.’3 There are several
dimensions to the concept of consistency of punishment. First, all sentences should
follow the same underlying principles, thus creating a coherent and harmonious
system. Second, sentences should be based exclusively on legally relevant factors.
Finally, similar factors should be given similar weight in all sentencing decisions
unless some special circumstances require otherwise. The last dimension refers to
predictability of sentencing. The predictability of sentences can be seen as one of
the necessary components of fair and consistent sentencing practice.
This article analyses the sentencing jurisprudence of the ICTY and assesses its
predictability. Themain text is divided into three parts. In thenext section the theor-
etical and normative underpinnings of the ICTY’s sentencing regime are discussed.
The second section addresses the motivation of the study and the methodology.
In the ﬁnal part the ICTY sentencing practice is described and the results of the
statistical analysis are examined.
1. THE ICTY PENAL REGIME IN LAW
The ICTY Statute,4 together with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Rules),5
provide only general guidelines as to what factors should be taken into account
in sentencing considerations. Judges are vested with rather extensive discretionary
powers when deciding on the appropriate sentence. This broad discretion is only
slightly limited by the Statute and the Rules.
According to these documents the sentence shall be restricted to imprisonment.6
The judges are also instructed, if it is applicable, to order the restitution of property
2 UNDoc. S/RES 827 (1993).
3 Prosecutor v. Delalic´, Mucic´, Delic´ and Landzˇo, Judgement, Case No. IT-96–21-A, App. Ch., 20 February 2001,
para. 756.
4 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia adopted 25May 1993 byResolution
827, supra note 2 (hereinafter ICTY Statute).
5 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, UNDoc.
IT/32/Rev. 37 (1994) (hereinafter Rules), Rules 100 and 101.
6 ICTY Statute, supra note 4, Art. 24; Rules, supra note 5, Rule 101.
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unlawfully acquired by criminal conduct, to its legal owner.7 This remedy, however,
has never been used in the ICTY jurisprudence.
The factors that judges shall take into account in the sentencing determination
include ‘such factors as the gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances
of the convicted person’.8 These should form the central issues from which the
determination of the sentence evolves. As noted by the trial chamber in the Cˇelebic´i
case, ‘[b]y far themost important consideration,whichmaybe regardedas the litmus
test for theappropriate sentence, is thegravityof theoffence’.9 Thegravity is assessed
by the ICTY judges mainly on a case-by-case basis:
The determination of the gravity of the crime requires a consideration of the particular
circumstances of the case, as well as the form and degree of the participation of the
accused in the crime.10
No objective scale exists wherein the crimes under the ICTY’s jurisdiction are
distinguishedintermsoftheir inherentgravity.Thereisnosuchthingasasentencing
tariff setting minimum and maximum penalties for individual crimes. Individual
offencesarenotpre-categorized intermsof theirobjectivegravityandcorresponding
sentence range. The seriousness of individual crimes is appraised on a case-by-case
basis without referring to any objective benchmark. The only limitation in this
respect can be found in Rule 101 of the Rules – the longest possible sentence is life
imprisonment.
The seriousness of the crime is often discussed together with aggravating
circumstances;11 the obligation to consider mitigating and aggravating circum-
stances is explicitly provided for in Rule 101. However, there is no illustration of
what circumstances could justify a reduction of or increase in the sentence.12 There
are only two factors explicitlymentioned in the law: ‘mitigation due to a substantial
co-operationwith the Prosecutor’13 and ‘mitigation for acting on thebasis of a super-
ior order’.14 Again, the judges are left free to ﬁll this lacuna on a case-by-case basis.
According to the case law, aggravating factors should be proved by the prosecution
beyondany reasonabledoubt and shouldbedirectly related to the chargedoffence.15
A lesser standard of proof applies to mitigating factors – they should be proved
on the balance of probabilities and may include circumstances not directly related
to the offence.16 The ﬁnal factor which should play a role in the determination of
7 ICTY Statute, supra note 4, Art. 24(3).
8 Ibid., Art. 24(2).
9 Prosecutor v.Delalic´,Mucic´, Delic´ and Landzˇo, Judgement, CaseNo. IT-96–21-T, T.Ch. II, 16November 1998, para.
1225.
10 Prosecutor v. Josipovic´, Santic´, Z.Kupresˇkic´, M.Kupresˇkic´, V.Kupresˇkic´ and Papic´, Judgement, CaseNo. IT-95–16-T,
T.Ch. II, 14 January 2000, para. 852.
11 See Prosecutor v.Haradinaj, Balaj and Brahimaj, Judgement, CaseNo. IT-04–84-T, T.Ch. I, 3April 2008, para. 489.
12 In contrast, Rule 145 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court includes a
demonstrative list ofmitigating and aggravating factors. Themitigating and aggravating factors included in
the list actually reﬂect the ICTY and ICTR case law.
13 Rules, supra note 5, Rule 101.
14 ICTY Statute, supra note 4, Art. 7(4).
15 Prosecutor v. Stakic´, Judgement, Case No. IT-97–24-T, T.Ch. II, 31 July 2003, para. 911.
16 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovacˇ and Vukovic´, Judgement, Case No. IT-96–23&23/1-T, T.Ch. I, 22 February 2001,
para. 911.
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the sentence is ‘the general practice regarding prison sentences in the territory of
the former Yugoslavia’. This provision has been construed by judges restrictively,
holding that it does not render an obligation to follow the domestic Yugoslavian
practice.17
The positive law is silent as regards the rationales for sentencing. However, some
principles have emerged in the case law. In this respect, judges clearly found inspir-
ation in classical domestic penal theories. Among them, deterrence and retribution
are given primary attention.18 The weight of rehabilitative concerns is considered
to be limited, especially in the light of the gravity of international crimes.19 These
classical rationales of punishment are from time to time complemented by senten-
cing principles developed to reﬂect the speciﬁcs of international crimes, such as
the principle of reconciliation of societies fractured by long-lasting violence or the
principle of restoration of peace.20 Also the educative function of international sen-
tencing, in a sense of making it clear that the international criminal law is indeed
enforced, is often emphasized.21 All these principles form a general background
against which the individual sentence should be determined. Decisions of judges
as to which aggravating and mitigating factors would be acceptable are informed
by these rationales. Most of the aggravating factors accepted by the chambers so far
are underpinned by retributive concerns. The culpability of the offender is often
emphasized in this respect. Rehabilitative concerns togetherwith reconciliation are
often behindmitigation of the punishment.
These principles, stemming from the case law, together with the positive law,
form the legal framework of sentencing considerations. This framework establishes
only aminimal set of legal constraints on the judges’ determination of the sentence.
On one hand, this considerable amount of discretion enables judges to reﬂect on
the particularities of every case and to individualize the sentence, but on the other
hand this gap of discretion makes sentencing decisions vulnerable to legally irrel-
evant inﬂuences.22 Whether judges have so far managed to establish a predictable
sentencing practice based on the strict legal criteria is assessed in the following
paragraphs.
2. METHODOLOGY
2.1. Methods
Most of the scholarly attention concerning the ICTY so far has been devoted to the
legal and normative aspects of its activities. Empirical and quantitative studies of
17 The SFRY sentencing practice is, however, one of the factors judges should take into account. If a sentence
departs from limits set in this practice, reasons must be given for such a departure. See Prosecutor v. Dragan
Nikolic´, Judgement, Case No. IT-94–2-A, App. Ch., 4 February 2005, para. 69.
18 Prosecutor v.Aleksovski, Judgement, Case No. IT-95–14/1-A, App. Ch., 24 March 2000, para. 185.
19 Prosecutor v. Kordic´ and Cˇerkez, Judgement, Case No. IT-95–14/2-A, App. Ch., 17 December 2004, para. 1079.
20 Prosecutor v.Nikolic´, Judgement, Case No. IT-02–60/1-T, T.Ch. I, 2 December 2003, paras. 58–60.
21 Prosecutor v.Nikolic´, Judgement, Case No. IT-94–2-S, T.Ch. II, 18 December 2003, para. 139.
22 Sentence determination should only be based on legally relevant factors. It should never be affected by
consideration of the so-called extra-legal factors such as the ethnicity, race, or gender of the offender. Cf. A.
Ashworth, ‘Sentencing’, in M. Maguire, R. Morgan, and R. Reiner (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology
(2007), 990 at 1003; see note 23, infra.
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the ICTY sentencing process have been scarce. In these rare cases, a combination
of various legal and extra-legal factors and their inﬂuence on sentence length was
examined.23 According to Meernik and King, only the legal factors – that is, factors
derived from international law, the ICTY Statute and the Rules – play a signiﬁcant
role in predicting sentence length.24 The other legally irrelevant considerations do
not seem to predict signiﬁcantly the sentencing outcome.25 In their studiesMeernik
and King focused on the combined effect of the legal and extra-legal factors on the
sentence. They paid only fragmentary attention to the interplay of the legal factors
exclusively.26 In this article, therefore, only the legal factors and their predictive
value in relation to sentence length will be examined. In order to acquire a more
comprehensive picture of the dynamics of the legal factors,more legal determinants
of thesentence lengthwere identiﬁedandincludedinthemodel.Since ingeneralone
single sentence is pronounced for each convicted individual, data were organized
and sentences were estimated on a person-by-person basis. At the time of writing27
63 individuals have been sentenced by the ICTY.28 Based on the analysis of the case
law, the following data were collected for each individual: (i) the length of the ﬁnal
sentence before any reduction due to time spent in detention; (ii) the number of
counts on which a person was convicted; (iii) the category of crime for which they
were convicted; (iv) themode of responsibility; (v) the number ofmitigating factors;
(vi) the number of aggravating factors; (vii) a guilty plea; and, ﬁnally, (viii) actual
rank in the military or political hierarchy.29 All these data were obtained from the
written versions of the judgments published on the ICTY web page.30
All the collected data were then analysed by the analytical software SPSS 14.0 for
Windows. First, the basic descriptive statistic, such as mean sentence and median
sentence,31 were computedandcompared. Thereafter, amultiple regressionanalysis
23 The legal factors are those considerations that shouldplayadecisive role in the sentencedetermination.They
are derived from international law, the ICTY Statute, and the Rules, and include factors such as nature of the
crime, degreeof responsibility, or aggravatingormitigating circumstances. In contrast, the extra-legal factors
are factors not regulated or permitted by law. They should not inﬂuence the sentence decision-making in
any way. Examples of these legally irrelevant considerations are, e.g., ethnicity of the offender, professional
background or personal characteristics of judges, or political factors.
24 J. Meernik and K. L. King, ‘The Effectiveness of International Law and the ICTY – Preliminary Results
of an Empirical Study’, (2001) 1 International Criminal Law Review 343; J. Meernik and K. L. King, ‘The
Sentencing Determinants of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: An Empirical
and Doctrinal Analysis’, (2003) 16 LJIL 717; J. Meernik, ‘Victor’s Justice or the Law? Judging and Punishing
at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, (2003) 47 Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 140;
J. Meernik, K. L. King, and G. Dancy, ‘Judicial Decision Making and International Tribunals: Assessing the
Impact of Individual, National and International Factors’, (2005) 86 Social Science Quarterly 683.
25 Meernik, supra note 24, at 159; Meernik, King, and Dancy, supra note 24, at 701.
26 There is only one studywhere solely the interplay between sentence length and the legal factors is examined.
However, the number of legal factors included in the study is rather limited. See Meernik, supra note 24; in
all the other studies legal factors are combined with extra-legal, such as ethnicity, national background of
judges, or judges’ gender. In all these studies, therefore, the ﬁnal result may be affected by the inclusion of
these extra-legal factors.
27 The data were collected up to August 2008.
28 This number includes all the ﬁnal judgments and all cases where sentence was handed down by the trial
chamber but the case is still pending on appeal.
29 Speciﬁc reasons for selecting these particular variables are provided further in the text; see section 2.2., infra.
30 Available at www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm.
31 Themean sentence is the arithmetic mean of all sentences (mathematical average). The median sentence is
the sentence which lies exactly in the middle of the sentence distribution – half of the issued sentences lies
above the median and half below. As opposed to mean, median is not inﬂuenced by extreme sentences.
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was conductedwith sentence length as dependent variable.Multiple regression ana-
lysis is a statistical technique that attempts to predict from independent variables
a dependent variable – that is, in our case, sentence length. It seeks a combination
of predictors that is maximally correlated with the sentence. It then enables as-
sessment of the relative importance of the individual predictors given the effect of
other variables in the model. Multiple regression accounts for a combined effect of
all predictors included in the model. Whenever an independent variable is found
signiﬁcant, it has a predictive value for sentence length given the effect of the other
variables entered into the analysis.32 As such, the analysis shows the added value of
each independent variable for predicting sentence length after the effect of all the
other predictors has been taken into account.33
Theindependentvariables includedintheanalysiswere (i)numberofconvictions
(actual number); (ii) number of aggravating factors (actual number); (iii) number
of mitigating factors (actual number); (iv) category of crimes (dummy variable –
conviction for war crimes used as a reference category); (v) guilty plea; (vi) superior
responsibility; (vii) direct perpetration; (viii) participation in joint criminal enter-
prise (JCE); (ix) ordering; (x) instigating; (xi) planning; or (xii) aiding and abetting
(all dichotomous variables, YES/NO); and, ﬁnally, (xiii) actual rank (dummyvariable
with low rank as a reference category).Multiple regression analysiswith a backward
elimination was used. In this method all the independent variables are ﬁrst entered
into the model. Then those factors that do not signiﬁcantly predict sentence length
are gradually removed. The resultingmodel is limited to only those variableswhich
play a signiﬁcant role in predicting sentence length. As the aim of this study was
explorative – to explain the dynamics of the legal factors behind the sentence de-
termination – this particular method is appropriate. All the statistical assumptions
for using this method were met.34
2.2. Independent variables
2.2.1. Category of crimes
Each offence under the ICTY jurisdiction can be qualiﬁed as a war crime, as a crime
against humanity, or as genocide.35 If a scale of severity of these categories of crimes
were proposed then genocide would probably be at the top. Due to its extreme
gravity, magnitude, and speciﬁc features, genocide is often denoted as ‘the crime of
crimes’.36 However, the hierarchical relationship between crimes against humanity
32 In statistics, loosely speaking, a result is signiﬁcant when it is unlikely to occur by chance.
33 L. S. Meyers, G. Gamst, and A. J. Guarino, Applied Multivariate Research – Design and Interpretation (2006), at
147–50.
34 Normal distributionwas checked by inspecting a histogramof the standardized residuals. Homoscedasticity
was checked by inspecting a scatterplot of residuals versus predicted values of the sentence. Independence
of residuals was tested byDurbinWatson statistic. Its value equalled 1.906, indicating no ﬁrst-order autocor-
relation given the number of predictors in themodel and the sample size.Multicollinearity among variables
was also checked, using variance inﬂation factor (VIF) – the highest value was less than 1.9, thus meeting
tests of acceptability, which are normally set around 10. Ibid., at 198.
35 The category of war crimes includes crimes under Art. 2 of the Statute and crimes under Art. 3 of the Statute
without distinguishing between these two. The category of crimes against humanity includes crimes under
Art. 5 of the Statute. Genocide includes crimes under Art. 4 of the Statute.
36 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Judgement, ICTR-95–1-T, T.Ch. II, 21 May 1999, para. 9.
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ICTY SENTENCING PRACTICE 85
and war crimes is controversial. On one hand, in the current ICTY jurisprudence it
is emphasized that ‘there is in law no difference between crimes against humanity
and war crimes that would require, in respect of the same acts, that the former
be sentenced more harshly than the latter’.37 Judges take the position that there
is no difference in inherent gravity between those two categories of international
crimes. According to the case law, there should be no a-priori distinction in the
sentencing.38 On the other hand it has been argued that, in theory, because of their
special characteristics, crimes against humanity should constitute a more serious
category of crimes.39 First, the contextual element of crimes against humanity –
that is, their widespread or systematic character – is emphasized.40 Crimes against
humanitymustbecommittedaspartof large-scalepremeditatedattacks. Incontrast,
warcrimescanbe isolatedacts. Second, the speciﬁcmental elementof crimesagainst
humanity – that is, crimesmust be committedwith theknowledge that they arepart
of awidespreador systematic attack against civilians – is often added todemonstrate
their inherently more serious nature.41 Finally, it can also be argued that crimes
against humanity, as opposed to war crimes, target in a systematic or widespread
manner a group of people – ‘any civilian population’. Therefore a group of people,
not an individual as such, is the object of attack. This collective feature is an extra
element distinguishing crimes against humanity from war crimes. On account of
these characteristics crimes against humanity can be considered the more serious
category of international crimes per se.
In order to see whether any differences exist in actual sentencing practice, the
sentences for those above two categories have been examined separately. Where a
person has been convicted of both categories of crimes, he is then included only
in the allegedly ‘more serious category’ of crimes against humanity. Genocide as a
distinct group has not been included for pragmatic reasons; so far only one person
has been convicted by the ICTY of genocide – Radislav Krstic´.42
2.2.2. Aggravating factors
The assessment of the gravity of the offence is also linked to the consideration of
aggravating factors. When aggravating circumstances are found, the seriousness of
the offence is said to increase. Sentence length should reﬂect this enhanced gravity.
It is expected that as the number of aggravating factors rises, the sentence increases
accordingly. In practice, a large variety of aggravating circumstances have been
37 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgement, Case No. IT-95–17/1-A, App. Ch., 21 July 2000, para. 243.
38 In contrast, in the early ICTY cases it was accepted that ‘an act committed as a part of a crime against
humanity, [i]s all else being equal, a more serious offence than an ordinary war crime’. Prosecutor v. Tadic´,
Sentencing Judgement, Case No. IT-94–1-T, T.Ch. II, 14 July 1997, para. 73; Prosecutor v. Erdemovic´, Case No.
IT-96–22-A, App. Ch., 7 October 1997, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah, paras. 20–
22; This approach was subsequently condemned on appeal in Prosecutor v. Tadic´, Judgement in Sentencing
Appeals, Case No. IT-94–1-A, App. Ch., 26 January 2000, para. 69.
39 See A. Carcano, ‘Sentencing and the Gravity of the Offence in International Criminal Law’, (2002) 51 Inter-
national and Comparative LawQuarterly 583, at 607–9; O. A. Olusanya, ‘Do Crimes against Humanity Deserve
a Higher Sentence thanWar Crimes?’, (2004) 4 International Criminal Law Review 431.
40 M. Frulli, ‘Are Crimes against Humanity More Serious thanWar Crimes?’, (2001) 12 EJIL 329, at 333–8.
41 Ibid.
42 Prosecutor v. Krstic´, Case No. IT-98–33.
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recognized by the judges. The most frequent factors accepted in aggravation are as
follows:
1. abuse of superior position/position of authority or trust (accepted in 35 cases);
2. special vulnerability of victims (accepted in 31 cases);
3. extreme suffering or harm inﬂicted on victims (accepted in 25 cases);
4. large number of victims (accepted in 15 cases); and
5. cruelty of the attack (accepted in 14 cases).
2.2.3. Number of counts
Most of the accused before the ICTY were found guilty of several criminal acts. The
practice has evolved in the direction of handing down a single sentence to cover all
guilty counts. Therefore it is impossible to distinguish among individual crimes and
their relative contribution to total sentence length. Transparency of sentencing in
this respect is lacking. This fact was one of the reasons for usingmultiple regression
analysis. If we want to tease out the contribution of individual factors to sentence
length, multiple regression is the most appropriate method in this respect.
The single sentence should reﬂect the totality of theoffender’s criminal activities.
When a person is convicted for more crimes, he or she should be subjected to
severer punishment. When somebody’s criminal activity is based on multiple acts,
it is expected that his or her sentence increases accordingly, in order to reﬂect all
criminal activities.Only in thismanner is thegravityof all his orher crimesproperly
accounted for.
2.2.4. The actual rank of the offender
Assessment of the gravity of the crimes should also include appraisal of the degree
and the form of participation of the offender. In practice, the actual position of the
perpetrator in a state military or political structure can often indicate his personal
contribution to criminal activities. Therefore the actual status of the offender may
play a signiﬁcant role in determining the sentence. In case of international crimes,
it is widely accepted that those to be blamed most should be those occupying high
and inﬂuential positions in themilitary or political hierarchy.43 Systematic violence
committed on such a large scale as to qualify as an international crime is hardly
conceivablewithout thoseat thetoplevelsof thestatehierarchydevisingdestructive
policies, implementing them, and persuading others to follow.Without inﬂuential
and high-ranking supporters of these policies there would be no systematic and
widespread violence. Generally, perpetrators of mass atrocities can be divided into
three broad categories: leaders (perpetrators at the tophierarchical levels), superiors
(offenders occupying middle-ranking positions), and actual killers (low-ranking
individuals). Thesegroups represent thedescending level ofmoralblameworthiness
43 C. Del Ponte, ‘Prosecuting the Individuals Bearing the Highest Level of Responsibility’, (2004) 2 Journal of
International and Comparative Law 516.
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for atrocity.44 In addition, as the abuse of superior position is the most cited and
emphasized aggravating factor in the ICTY jurisprudence, it is expected that as one
rises to a higher level in the hierarchy, the sentence increases accordingly.45
To assess possible differences in sentencing different ranks of offenders, all con-
victed individuals have been divided into the following three categories: (i) low-
ranking offenders – those who held little or no power and inﬂuence in the overall
circumstances of the Yugoslavian conﬂict, such as camp guards, ordinary soldiers,
or local commanders and sub-commanders (21 convicted); (ii) middle-ranking of-
fenders – those who held the authority to command and inﬂuence the conduct
of others, such as camp commanders or senior army ofﬁcers with more extensive
power of command (26 convicted); and (iii) high-ranking offenders – those who
held leadership positions in the military or political structure at the regional and
national level, such asmembers of a regional government ormilitary ofﬁcers above
the rank of colonel (16 convicted).
2.2.5. The mode of responsibility
The mode of responsibility serves as another important indicator of the form and
degree of the offender’s participation in the crimes committed. It reﬂects his actual
criminal conduct and his unique contribution to the crimes committed. According
to the ICTY Statute, there is a distinction between superior responsibility and other
modes of individual responsibility. The latter category is further divided, based
on Article 7 of the Statute, into (i) direct perpetrators; (ii) participants in JCE; (iii)
planners; (iv) instigators; (v)order-givers;and(vi)aidersandabetters.Thisdistinction
enables the judges todistinguishbetweendifferentdegreesof individualguilt.Given
the different elements of the individual modes – different degree of involvement of
the offender in the crimes (actus reus) and his different state of mind (mens rea) –
there should be a consequent difference in punishment. There are two basic groups:
primary or principal liability (direct perpetration, co-perpetration), and secondary
or accessory liability (participation in JCE,46 planning, instigating, ordering, and
aiding and abetting).47 When someone is held to be guilty as an accessory, this
suggests that his behaviour had a substantial effect on the commission of a crime
by someone else. In the case of principal responsibility the crime is ascribed to
his own conduct.48 This difference in actual criminal conduct should be reﬂected
in the sentencing. However, there is one important caveat peculiar to international
44 Cf. M. A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (2007), at 25; A. Smeulers, ‘Perpetrators of
International Crimes: Towards a Typology’, in A. Smeulers and R. Haveman (eds.), Supranational Criminology:
Towards a Criminology of International Crimes (2008), at 233.
45 Prosecutor v. Babic´, Judgement, Case No. IT-03–72-A, App. Ch., 18 July 2005, para. 80.
46 The classiﬁcation of JCE as a principal or derivative mode of responsibility is contentious in theory and
not really clear and settled in the case law. This fact relates to its combined common/civil law origin. It
can also be argued that participants in the ﬁrst and second category of JCE can be seen as co-perpetrators
falling under the category of primarymodes of responsibility. For an interesting discussion thereof see E. van
Sliedregt, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to Convicting Individuals for Genocide’, (2006) 5 Journal of
International Criminal Justice 184.
47 E. vanSliedregt,TheCriminalResponsibility of Individuals forViolations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw (2003).
48 G. Werle, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute’, (2007) 5 Journal of International and
Comparative Law 953, at 955.
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crimes. It doesnotoftenoccur thatpersons at thehighest levels of the statehierarchy
participatepersonally inthecommittedatrocitiesasdirectperpetrators. Insteadthey
usually co-operate in planning, instigating, or ordering the commission of crimes.
Those individualsareusually far removed fromtheactual crimescene.But, as argued
above, thesearetheonestobeblamedmost,nottheirrespectivefollowers.Systematic
and widespread violence is hardly conceivable without planning, instigation, and
eventual orders coming from top ofﬁcials through mid-level superiors to actual
perpetrators. Therefore, despite the fact that ordering, instigation, and planning are
classiﬁedasderivativemodesofresponsibility, thesentencesfor internationalcrimes
should reﬂect theseconsiderations. It isnot suggestedhere thatplanners, instigators,
andorder-giversmustnecessarilybehigher-rankingoffenders.Requirementsofactus
reus andmens rea for thesemodesof responsibility canbe satisﬁedbyanyperpetrator
irrespective of his or her rank. But in amajority of cases those convicted by the ICTY
for planning, instigation, or ordering have been those occupying middle- or high-
ranking positions.49
2.2.6. Mitigating factors
Mitigating factorsmaybe relatednotonly to the crimes committedbut also to theof-
fender’sattributes.Theyoftenreﬂect the individualcircumstancesof theperpetrator
at the time of sentencing. In contrast to aggravating factors, acceptance of factors
in mitigation should result in a lesser punishment. Therefore it is expected that,
where more factors in mitigation are identiﬁed, a shorter sentence is pronounced.
Similarly to aggravation, a great variety of factors is taken in mitigation by ICTY
judges. Those cited most often by the judges include the following:
1. family circumstances (cited in 35 cases);
2. remorse (cited in 27 cases);
3. assistance to victims (cited in 24 cases);
4. conduct in detention (cited in 22 cases); and
5. voluntary surrender (cited in 22 cases).
2.2.7. A guilty plea
The ﬁnal factor considered in the analysis is whether or not the defendant pleaded
guilty. At the time ofwriting, 20 defendants have pleaded guilty before the Tribunal.
A guilty plea was included as a separate variable for several reasons. First, a guilty
plea has always been considered an aspect in mitigation and, as has been argued in
the literature, it is repeatedly one of themost inﬂuentialmitigating factors the ICTY
49 The only low-ranking offenderwhowas convicted for instigation by the ICTYwas Zoran Zˇigic´, a guard at the
Keraterm camp, who was convicted inter alia for committing, instigating, and aiding and abetting serious
crimes in Keraterm and Trnopolje camps. See Prosecutor v. Kvocˇka et al., Judgement, Case No. IT-98–30/1-T,
T.Ch. I, 2November2001,para. 747.All theotheroffendersheldguiltyof theplanning,ordering,or instigation
of crimes were indeedmiddle- or high-ranking individuals.
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judgeswillaccept.50 Second, theguiltypleahasoftenbeenlinkedwiththeexpression
of remorse and (substantial) co-operation with the Prosecutor – these are other
commonly accepted mitigating circumstances. In every case of a guilty plea there
has been this speciﬁc accumulation of mitigating factors calling for a signiﬁcant
reduction in the sentence. In addition, every time a defendant pleads guilty there
is a separate sentencing hearing. This fact can have some impact on the sentence
determination, sinceattentionis thendevotedonlytothesentencingconsiderations.
In contrast, in ‘normal’ cases sentencing arguments must be presented before the
determination of guilt. Therefore most attention is devoted to the consideration of
the guilt of the accused and not to the potential sentence. On the basis of all these
arguments, it is expected that the sentences of those pleading guilty will be lower.
3. THE ICTY PENAL REGIME IN PRACTICE
3.1. Descriptive overview
Until August 2008 the ICTY’s trial chambers had handed down 67 convictions and
sentences, and nine defendants had been acquitted. Fifty-ﬁve trial judgments were
appealed against by either a defendant or the Prosecutor. On appeal, four defendants
were acquitted and ten appeal proceedings are currently still pending.51
The mean length of all the issued sentences is 15.152 years; the median is 15
years.53 The sentences range from two years to the longest possible sentence –
life imprisonment.54 When only ﬁrst-instance decisions are examined the mean
sentence is 15.9 years, the median being 15 years. The mean sentence issued by the
Appeal Chamber is 14.9 years, with a median of 15 years. In the majority of cases
sentences issued by the trial chambers are either conﬁrmed or reduced on appeal.
In only three cases has the Appeal Chamber modiﬁed a sentencing decision to the
detriment of the accused.55
On average, a person is convicted on 4.6 counts; this number is higher when only
the ﬁrst-instance decisions are analysed, when the average rises to 5.1. The most
frequent conviction is for the crime of persecution under Article 5(h) of the Statute;
currently, 35 accused have been found guilty of persecution. The average sentence
of those convicted is 16.5 years.
50 S. M. Sayers, ‘Defence Perspectives on Sentencing Practice in the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia’, (2003) 16 LJIL 751, at 768.
51 This number includes also the appeal proceedings following acquittals of RamushHaradinaj, Idriz Balaj, and
Ljube Boskoski on trial. See Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Brahimaj and Balaj, Judgement, Case No. IT-04–84, T.Ch. I,
3 April 2008; Prosecutor v. Boskoski and Tarculovski, Judgement, Case No. IT-04–82, T.Ch. II, 10 July 2008.
52 In this article all the numbers have been rounded to one decimal place.
53 See note 28, supra; these numbers include all the ﬁnal judgments and all cases where sentence was handed
down by the trial chamber but the case is still pending on appeal. For the purposes of statistical analysis
life sentences were recoded to reﬂect the expected duration of the imprisonment term in each individual
case, primarily taking into account the age of a sentenced person (a life sentence has been handed down to
two defendants so far – to Milomir Stakic´ at trial and Stanislav Galic´ on appeal; it has been recoded in the
following way: Stakic´: life→30 years; Galic´: life→ 20 years).
54 SeeProsecutorv.Hadzihasanovic´andKubura, Judgement,CaseNo. IT-01–47-A,App.Ch.,22April2008;Prosecutor
v.Oric´, Case No. IT-03–68; Prosecutor v. Stakic´, Case No. IT-97–24; Prosecutor v.Galic´, Case No. IT-98–29.
55 Prosecutor v.Galic´, Case No. IT-98–29; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95–14/1; Prosecutor v.Krnolejac, Case
No. IT-97–25.
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TABLE 1. Comparison of average andmedian sentences (standard deviations are indicated in
parentheses).
Instance
Final
sentence
Crimes
against
humanity
War
crimes
High-
ranking
offenders
Middle-
ranking
offenders
Low-
ranking
offenders
No guilty
plea
Guilty
plea
Trial (years)
Average
sentence
15.3 (10.0)
60 cases
17.2 (10.2)
47 cases
8.4(5.4)
13 cases
21,6 (14.2)
12 cases
13.5 (9.6)
25 cases
13.9 (6.5)
23 cases
15.9 (10.6)
40 cases
14.1 (8.9)
20 cases
Median
sentence 14.0 17.0 7.0 18.5 10.0 15.0 15.0 12.5
Final
Average
sentence
14.6 (8.7)
56 cases
16,2 (8.9)
43 cases
9.1 (4.5)
13 cases
18.0 (11.9)
12 cases
13.3 (8.5)
24 cases
14.1 (6.1)
20 cases
15.1 (8.9)
36 cases
13.6 (8.31)
20 cases
Median
sentence 14.0 15.0 9.0 14.0 10.0 15.0 15.0 12.5
In tables 1 and 2, comparisons of the average and median sentences for different
groups of offenders are presented. The convicted have been categorized according
to the legal characteristics of their cases. The tables are divided into two rows: in
the ﬁrst row only the ﬁrst-instance sentences are analysed; in the second row all the
ﬁnalized sentences, including appeal chambers’ modiﬁcations, are compared.56
Table 1 data are given in eight columns. In the ﬁrst column the ﬁnal sentences
pronounced by the judges in all cases are given. The other columns represent dif-
ferent categories of cases. The sentences are examined separately on the basis of
category of crimes, the actual rank of the offender, and the guilty plea.
We can see from Table 1 that generally sentences were reduced once a case
went successfully to appeal. The comparison between the sentence length of those
convicted for crimes against humanity and those convicted for war crimes is also
interesting. The perpetrators of crimes against humanity are sent to prison for
substantially lengthier terms.
As regards the sentences of differently ranking offenders, the highest-ranking
individuals have been sentenced to substantially longer terms than their subordin-
ates. However, there is not, as might be expected, a reduction in the sentence length
whenwemove frommiddle-ranking offenders to low-ranking individuals. The low-
ranking offenders are apparently punished more severely. A possible explanation
can be seen in the fact that the low-ranking individuals, as the actual killers, rap-
ists, and torturers, are, in the light of the actual brutality and depravity of their
acts, assigned blame equal to or greater than that assigned to their direct superiors.
These considerations seem to add to the sentence and ﬁnally counterbalance the
assessment of the relative role of the offender in the overall situation.
56 In the followinganalysis only theﬁnalized caseshavebeen includedandcompared, including cases of appeal
acquittals (trial N= 60, appeal N= 56). If cases pending on appeal had also been included, the comparisons
might have been biased. In cases of the life sentences handed down by the ICTY to two defendants so far
(Milomir Stakic´ and Stanislav Galic´), the sentence length was recoded. See note 53, supra.
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Finally, those who pleaded guilty have been sentenced to slightly shorter prison
terms. However, the difference between the sentences of those pleading guilty and
those not so doing is minimal. This is at odds with the general belief that a guilty
plea results in much lower sentences. Obviously, those pleading guilty may again
have other characteristics that lead to higher sentences.
TABLE 2. Comparison of average andmedian sentences (standard deviations are indicated in
parentheses)
Instance Superiors Perpetrators
Joint
criminal
enterprise Planners Instigators
Order-
givers Aiders
Trial (years)
Average
sentence
11.8 (10.6)
18 cases
17.5(8.0)
20 cases
16.3 (9.8)
22 cases
18.5 (9.2)
2 cases
19.8 (15.4)
3 cases
21.8 (12.8)
8 cases
14.1 (8.4)
17 cases
Median
sentence 7.75 17.5 15.0 18.5 25.0 20.0 13.0
Final
Average
sentence
10.7 (6.3)
15 cases
17.3 (7.7)
21 cases
14.6 (8.4)
19 cases
18.5 (9.2)
2 cases
20.7 12.1)
3 cases
16.8 (7.8)
9 cases
16.2 (8.5)
18 cases
Median
sentence 9.0 18.0 13.0 18.5 25.0 18.0 15.0
Table 2 data are given in seven columns, divided on the basis of the different
modes of individual responsibility underlying the offender’s conviction.
On one hand, in line with the arguments above, those who planned or instig-
ated crimes have indeed been subjected to the severest punishments. On the other
hand, ﬁnal sentences of those giving the orders have been lower than sentences pro-
nounced on the actual perpetrators. It is remarkable that those giving the orders –
usually offenders occupyinghigher ranking and inﬂuential positions –are punished
less severely than the actual perpetrators – their subordinates. It has been argued
that, given their position of authority and their speciﬁc role in the commission
of international crimes, the sentences of those giving the orders should rather be
comparable with the higher sentences of the instigators and planners.57
The lowest sentences have been given to those convicted on the basis of superior
responsibility. This may be due to the fact that the superior responsibility lies in
a passive behaviour of a superior – a failure to punish subordinates or to prevent
them from committing crimes. The omissions of superiors are perceived as being
less serious offences than active participation in criminal activities. This ﬁnding
can also be linked to the difference discussed above between the sentences imposed
on middle-ranking offenders and those imposed on the others. Those at the middle
levels of the hierarchy are often found responsible for omissions in their capacity as
superiors. This fact is most probably also reﬂected in the generally lower sentences
of the middle-ranking offenders.
57 For the relationship between the rank of the offender and these modes of responsibility see note 49 and
accompanying text, supra.
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After appeal, the second-lowest sentences have been handed out to participants
in JCE. Even thosewhowere convicted purely as accomplices – aiders and abetters –
have been punished more severely. Yet, it is argued in theory that due to its speciﬁc
mens rea – ‘the commonpurpose/plan element’ – participation in JCE should be con-
sidered a more serious contribution to a criminal activity than aiding and abetting.
Participation in JCE connotes a close involvement in the commission of a crime,
while aiding and abetting constitutes mere facilitation. The degree of culpability of
JCE participants is arguably higher that that of aiders and abetters.58 Furthermore,
the concept of JCE has been used by the ICTY primarily in the identiﬁcation of
the criminal acts of higher-ranking government andmilitary ofﬁcials in organizing
systemic criminality.59 Onewould expect, therefore, that it attracts generally higher
penalties. Apparently, however, there are in practice additional legally relevant sen-
tencing factors that lead to the surprisingly low sentences for participants in JCE or
to the higher sentences for aiders and abetters.
On closer inspection of Table 2 another notable fact is revealed, related to the
considerations in the previous paragraph: contrary to other categories, the ﬁnal
sentences of aiders and abetters are much longer than the sentences pronounced at
trial. Aiders and abetters are thus sentenced more severely on appeal. Often those
convicted on appeal of aiding had been originally held guilty as participants within
the jointcriminalenterprise.60 It is conceivable thatat trial thesentencewasaimedat
reﬂecting themore serious involvement of the JCEparticipant in criminal activities.
Once thismodeof responsibilitywas changed to thepurely derivative responsibility
of aiding by the Appeal Chamber, it appears that the appellate judges did not want
to depart in a signiﬁcant manner from the benchmark set by the original sentence
pronounced for JCEparticipants at trial. This explanation is further underpinned by
the fact that there is, in general, no new evidence admissible on appeal in relation
to the sentencing.
3.2. The sentencingmodel
To understand better the differences in sentencing between examined categories of
cases, amultivariate analysiswasused to assess the factors that inﬂuence sentencing
decisions. All 63 individuals sentenced by the Tribunal so far have been included
in the analysis. The backward method of multiple regression analysis was used to
examinehow the selected legal factors statistically predict sentence length. Initially,
14 different independent variables were entered into the model.61
58 Sliedregt, supra note 46, at 196.
59 Sliedregt, supra note 47, at 106.
60 Cf. Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic´, Judgement, Case No. IT-98–32-A, App. Ch., 25 February 2004; Prosecutor v. Krstic´,
Judgement, Case No. IT-98–33-A, App. Ch., 19 April 2004; Prosecutor v. Simic´, Tadic´ and Zaric´, Judgement, Case
No. IT-95–9-A, App. Ch., 28 November 2004.
61 See section 2.1 ‘Methods’, supra; we are aware of the fact that, statistically, using 14 predictors for 63 cases
is stretching the technique. On one hand, due to obvious practical limitations – ICTY has issued sentences
to only 63 individuals so far – we were not able to enlarge our sample; in fact, we are analysing the entire
population of ICTY sentenced offenders. On the other hand, we wanted to include all possible important
legal determinants of sentence length in order to provide the reader with the complete picture (e.g. the
category of mode of responsibility in itself consists of seven separate variables – it is impossible to leave
out any of them). Reassuringly, despite the limited number of cases compared with the number of included
predictors, the resulting model turned out to be stable across different sets of predictors.
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TABLE 3. ICTY sentencingmodel
Variable Coefﬁcient
Standardized
coefﬁcient p-value
High rank 10.9 0.5 .000
Middle rank 2.2 0.1 .231
Number of guilty counts 0.7 0.4 .000
Conviction for crimes against humanity 6.1 0.3 .001
Number of mitigating factors −0.6 −0.2 .025
Instigation 7.7 0.2 .032
Perpetration 3.4 0.2 .079
Superior responsibility −3.5 −0.2 .058
N= 63
R2 = 0.653
Adjusted R2 = 0.602
Standard error of estimate= 5.7909
Joint signiﬁcance test of the model: F test (8, 54)= 12.704, p< 0.001
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 3. Five of all the entered legal
variablesarestatisticallysigniﬁcant–that is, these factors,giventheotherpredictors,
contribute signiﬁcantly to predicting sentence length. Overall, 60 per cent of the
sentence variation can be explained by the combination of these legal variables. The
table is divided into four columns. In the ﬁrst column, labels of individual selected
predictors are indicated. Coefﬁcients, displayed in the second column, represent
the change in sentence length for a one-unit change of a respective predictor when
remaining predictors are held constant. For example, the coefﬁcient for number of
guilty counts, after controlling for all other variables included in the model, is 0.7.
Thus each additional guilty count tends to result in a 0.7-year increase in sentence
length, given the effect of other predictors. The values of coefﬁcients reﬂect each
predictor in its original unit of measurement and therefore are difﬁcult to compare.
The standardized coefﬁcients, shown in the third column, allow for comparisons
amongpredictors. They indicate the relative strength of eachpredictor in predicting
sentence length. The relative importance of individual predictors in the model can
thus be compared. In the ﬁnal column, p-value indicates whether a coefﬁcient is
statistically signiﬁcant – that is, whether a result is unlikely to occur by chance.
Generally, p-value is considered signiﬁcant when it is smaller than 0.05.
Based on the standardized coefﬁcients, the strongest predictor of sentence length
is the rank of the offender. When a sentenced person occupies a position at a high
level of a political or military hierarchy, his sentence is, ceteris paribus, 10.9 years
longer (approximately 131 months) than the sentence of a low-ranking offender.
Therefore those at the highest leadership levels are subjected to a more severe pun-
ishment than their respective followers – those without any inﬂuence whatsoever
in the overall conﬂict. Given the characteristics of international crimes this differ-
ential treatment is justiﬁed. The regression analysis also conﬁrmed that there is no
statistically signiﬁcantdifferencebetween the sentencesofmiddle- and low-ranking
offenders, even when the effect of the other variables is taken into account. A pos-
sibleexplanation for thisphenomenon, already indicatedabove, is that in thesecases
considerations of the relative role of the offender in the overall conﬂict situation
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are overshadowed by considerations of the cruelty and depravity of the crimes com-
mitted. As opposed to their direct – middle-ranking – superiors, the low-ranking
offenders are in the majority of cases the actual perpetrators of brutal atrocities.
The second-strongest factor in predicting sentence length is the number of guilty
counts. As expected, the more counts on which the accused is found guilty, the
lengthier the sentence. All other things being equal, each additional guilty count
results in extra 0.7 years inprison (8months). Therefore themore extensive criminal
activity of the offender does indeed result in a more severe sentence.
Another major predictor of sentence length is the category of crime. To recap,
all offenders were divided into two categories depending on the legal qualiﬁcation
of their acts – crimes against humanity62 or war crimes.63 The analysis revealed
that there is indeed a substantial difference between the sentences of those found
guilty of crimes against humanity and those convicted for war crimes. The sen-
tence for perpetrators of crimes against humanity is approximately 6.1 years longer
(73months) than the sentence for those convicted solely on the basis of war crimes,
given the other predictors. One objection could be raised in this respect – the cat-
egory of crimes against humanity also included those cases where the offender was
convicted of both war crimes and crimes against humanity simultaneously. It can
be argued that it is this particular combination that makes the difference. Because
of this objection, the difference between the sentences pronounced exclusively for
either crimes against humanity or war crimes was further examined.64 This closer
examination corroborates theprevious interpretation: it is indeed the fact that those
convicted of crimes against humanity are punishedmore severely than those found
guilty ofwar crimes. This ﬁnding empirically underpins the need for further discus-
sions as to the creation of a seriousness scale of international crimes.
The number of mitigating factors stands out as another important predictor of
the sentence length. As expected, mitigating factors account for a reduction in the
sentence. Given all other factors, a sentence is on average reduced by 0.6 years
(7 months) for each mitigating factor. Therefore there is a clear pattern of sentence
reduction once a factor inmitigation is attributed. It was also expected that a guilty
plea, as one of the prominentmitigating factors, would result in a speciﬁc reduction
of the sentence. However, pleading guilty did not stand out in the model. This may
be due to the fact that the separate effect of the guilty plea was subsumed in the
overall effect of this general category – the number of mitigating factors.
Instigation is the ﬁnal signiﬁcant predictor of sentence length included in the
model.When somebody instigates others to commit a crime, his sentence increases
by an extra 7.7 years (92 months) when controlling for other variables. Despite the
62 The offenders were divided into categories on the basis of the ‘most serious crime’ of which they were
convicted. Therefore the category of crimes against humanity includes also those found guilty of multiple
acts under a combination of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
63 Genocide as a separate category was not included in the analysis because so far the ICTY has sentenced only
one person for genocide.
64 So far the ICTY has ﬁnalized 29 cases, with defendants convicted either for war crimes or crimes against
humanity. When the mean sentences are compared, those convicted solely of crimes against humanity are
sentenced to longer terms of imprisonment (N = 16, M = 11.31, SD = 5.35) than those found guilty of war
crimes (N= 13, M= 9.08, SD= 4.55).
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fact that therehaveonlybeen three casesof convicted instigators so far, instigation is
theonlymodeof responsibility that stoodout in the resultingmodel in a statistically
signiﬁcant way. This in itself speaks of its remarkable relevance in the prediction of
sentence length. That this is the case calls for special attention to be given to this
mode of responsibility in the future.
Finally, the analysis revealed emerging trends in sentencing the perpetrators
themselves and those convicted on the basis of superior responsibility, although
the coefﬁcients for these variables just missed statistical signiﬁcance. On one hand,
there is a trend of reducing the sentence when a person is convicted as a superior.
On the other hand, the sentences of actual perpetrators tend to be increased by an
extra 2.2 years.65
4. CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this article has been to explain the dynamics of the legal factors behind
the sentence determination by the ICTY judges and to assess whether the ICTY
sentencing practice is predictable. Predictability can be seen as one of the import-
ant elements of consistency and fairness of sentencing. It has been demonstrated
that the determination of the sentences can to a certain extent be predicted by the
examined legal factors. Well-interpretable and legally relevant patterns in the sen-
tencing practice have emerged: the high-ranking criminals in inﬂuential positions
are sentenced to substantially longer prison terms than the ordinary low-ranking
offenders. Those convicted ofmore extensive criminal activities are punishedmore
severely than perpetrators of isolated, single acts. The analysis has also suggested a
distinction in sentencingpracticebetweencrimesagainsthumanityandwarcrimes.
Those guilty of crimes against humanity receive longer sentences. Also, sentence
length is reduced if factors in mitigation are present. Finally, those who instigate
others to commit crimes are punishedmore severely than all the other participants
in the atrocities. The analysis also suggests emerging trends in the case law: (i) actual
perpetrators are sentenced to slightly longer prison terms; and (ii) superiors tend to
be punished less severely than all other participants in atrocities.66
Despite these patterns, approximately 40 per cent of the sentence variance re-
mains unexplained by the proposedmodel – that is, themodel accounted for 60 per
cent of the variation in sentence length. It is difﬁcult to judge the adequacy of this
number; from a theoretical perspective, it is impossible to evaluate it in objective
terms. There is no generally applicable gauge as to ‘how much should be predict-
able’ against which the result can be assessed. These considerations are related to
the empirical question ‘how much variance in sentencing is actually predictable?’
– that number is unknown and not likely to be 100 per cent. Arguably, there is
a multiplicity of legitimate factors inﬂuencing sentencing and it is impossible to
65 All the other legal factors analysed have been excluded from the analysis as not being signiﬁcant predictors
of sentence length.
66 Theword ‘trend’ is emphasized because the coefﬁcient for these predictors justmissed the level of statistical
signiﬁcance.
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include all these factors in the analysis. This is even more the case for our analysis,
where our small, in a statistical sense, sample limits thenumber of predictorswe can
include. It is conceivable that more variation in sentencing would be accounted for
if a more detailed analysis were performed. Possible further factors to be examined
include the underlying offence leading to a conviction (arguably it would make a
difference whether an offender were found guilty of murder or of appropriation
of property) or particular mitigating and aggravating factors. At the national level
empirical, quantitative studies of sentencing consistency have attempted to predict
sentencingoutcomeswithdifferent degrees of success.67 However, above 60per cent
of sentence variance explained by legally relevant factors is generally considered
evidence of fairly predictable sentencing practice.68 Given the underlying require-
ment of fairness of sentencing, it is important to realize that there always will be
unexplainedvariation in sentencing.And in fact, inorder tobe fair, sentences should
also reﬂect the particular individual circumstances of offenders. The necessary indi-
vidualization of a sentence is, next to sentencing predictability, another important
sentencing principle. Both these principles should be respected in order for sen-
tencing to be fair, and it is important to strike the right balance between the two.
If sentencing were 100 per cent predictable, this would mean that particular dif-
ferences between individual offenders would go unremarked, and such sentencing
could hardly be perceived to be fair. Fairness thus demands not only predictability
but a certain degree of unpredictability.
This study has demonstrated that despite the loose legal regulation, legally relev-
ant patterns in the ICTY sentencing jurisprudence have emerged. Five legal factors
are actually used in ICTY sentencing practice in a consistent and predictable way.
On the basis of the combination of these factors 60 per cent of sentence variation
can be explained. These ﬁndings can offer empirically based counter-arguments to
all the criticism raised against the ICTY sentencing regime as to its disparateness
and inconsistency.69 On the basis of this studywe can conclude that there are indeed
some consistent and predictable patterns in ICTY sentencing practice. The question
is whether being able to explain 60 per cent of variance on the basis of ﬁve legal
predictors is good enough. The answer to this question is amatter of bothnormative
judgement and empirical realism.
All theseconsiderationsare related to the recent calls for international sentencing
guidelines.70 It is often argued that, in order to address alleged existing unwarranted
disparities in international sentencing and to prevent inconsistencies, sentencing
67 Cf. P. L. Brantingham, ‘Sentencing Disparity: An Analysis of Judicial Consistency’, (1985) 1 Journal of Quant-
itative Criminology 281; for brief overview of similar studies see P. J. Hofer, K. R. Blackwell, and R. B. Ruback,
‘The Effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-judge Sentencing Disparity’, (1999) 90 Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology 239, at 242–3; B. J. Ostrom, C. W. Ostrom, R. A. Hansom, and M. Kleiman,
‘Assessing Consistency and Fairness in Sentencing: A Comparative Study in Three States’, National Center
for State Courts, available at www.ncsconline.org/images/PEWExecutiveSummaryv10.pdf.
68 Cf. Ostrom et al., supra note 67.
69 See note 1, supra.
70 Cf. Harmon and Gaynor, supra note 1, at 710; R. D. Sloane, ‘The Expressive Capacity of International Punish-
ment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, (2007) 43
Stanford Journal of International Law 39, at 89, 91; A. Cassese, ‘The ICTY: A Living and Vital Reality, (2004) 2
Journal of International Criminal Justice 585, at 596.
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decision-making should be more structured, in other words that there should be
more legal sentencing guidance. Our results might provide a good starting point
for such sentencing guidelines. At the same time it can be argued, based on our
results, that ICTY sentencing is already fairly structured and logical, as consistent
and detectable patterns in the ICTY sentencing practice determine sentence length
to a sizeable extent. Whether that pertains to other international sentencing is a
matter that we plan to investigate.
The call for sentencing guidelines is becoming even more relevant as more and
more international criminal courts emerge. The existence of sentencing guidelines
serving as a point of reference for international judges could make international
sentencingmore predictable and transparent, and thus consistent and fair; one issue
isnotonlywhether judgeswithinonetribunalortypeofinternationalcourtsentence
predictably, but alsowhether that is the case across legal institutions.Assuming that
all relevant factors are included, statistical analysis can be perceived as one of the
building blocks for understanding the phenomenon of international sentencing
and developing appropriate sentencing guidance. To achieve this objective, more
empirical and normative enquiries into international sentencing and international
crimes are warranted.
